Dealing with Entrenched Communal Conflict.
Seemingly impossible predicaments such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo,Cyprus and Bougainville in Papua-New Guinea require some kind of solution, but it is hard to know where to start. Fear, distrust and siege mentalities abound and no rational approach yields any change, so conventional remedies, such as trying to lower tensions, appear to have no effect. Typically the feuding parties are near
neighbours, who in a more normal situation would be fellow citizens in the same state, but such a scenario, though logical, would be unattainable, with the result that de facto partition,or some form of population transfer - preferably not ethnic cleansing - is the future prospect. That leads to a further problem, the almost superstitious dread amongst the international community of changing international boundaries, for the mainly unspoken fear is that one change will lead to others, possibly less welcome.
The sentiment, "there but for the grace of God go I," is powerful, though not always rational. The effects are palpable; logic and practicality would seem to indicate that Bosnia & Herzegovina should have been partitioned years ago between the Croat and Bosniak area and the self-styled Republica Srpska, but continuing, and ultimately futile, efforts are being made to encourage the notion that there is a single Bosnian state. If that far-fetched belief has to be kept alive, then at best the two de facto statelets will have to be formally yoked together in a dyadic federation, in which there are the formal trappings, such as a president, drawn from one community and a vice-president from the other, and a joint legislative assembly, which rarely meets and hardly functions at all. If there are meetings, then they either take place on neutral ground, or else under the scrutiny of armed guards, preferably from NATO or a UN force.
The agenda of any such gathering (if it were ever held) would be confined to consensual and practical issues, if any. The long term hope would be that eventually some practical issues would emerge, requiring attention, and that even bitter antagonists would recognize the sense in cooperating for those limited, but
desirable,purposes, and act accordingly. Progress would be likely to be very
slow.
Cyprus is another instance, but there is an historical precedent, which could help, namely, the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Then the contending parties, Greece and Turkey, agreed that mixed communities were impossible to maintain, and that the only peaceful and humane solution lay in population transfer. There followed exchanges between Asia Minor, which was emptied of Greeks, who settled instead in Greece, while minorities of Turks and other Muslims in Greek territory were transferred to Turkey. That arrangement, however distressing and traumatic, actually worked, achieving lasting peace.
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, however regrettable, has been followed by thirty-two years of occupation of the Northern zone, which has developed quite separately from the Southern sector, occupied by Greeks. The efforts to reunite the two sectors have had limited success, although both parts wish to be in full membership of the European Union, and the Turkish zone voted accordingly in 2004. To be strictly accurate, c.65% of the Turks did, while the vast majority of the Greeks
voted against - not because they opposed membership of the E.U., but to object to
reunification with the Northern sector on the basis of its continued existence as a distinctively Turkish community, organized as such. Thus far the European Union have treated Cyprus notionally as a whole as a member, but have in fact excluded the Turkish sector, although there was much satisfaction over the positive vote in the North in favour of EU membership. As a gesture of encouragement, the EU granted a substantial sum to the authorities in the North, to help develop that region economically.
However, the main impasse remains, for the Greeks in the South seem determined to reclaim the Northern sector, even to the point of asserting the claims of individual Greeks and their companies to the ownership of properties in the North, although many purchasers since 1974 have acquired those assets for their full market value and in accordance with the property laws existing in that sector. A month or so back an attempt by a former Greek owner to assert his claim to a dwelling bought by a British couple, who had arrived after the changes of 1974 and had acquired an apparently good title by Turkish Cypriot law, failed to do so. After a success in the courts of the South, he had tried to increase the pressure on the present occupiers by bringing an action in the English courts, but this was rejected.
Whether or not the English decision was right may be debateable, but what is disturbing is the absence of an agreed scheme for guaranteeing the rights of bona fide purchasers for value of properties in the North since 1974; and compensating fully those former owners or their heirs for the loss of the value of those properties effectively forfeited in 1974.
The irredentist attitudes of the Greek Cypriots, which have blocked the making of such an arrangement, simply obstruct the need for a settlement, so long overdue. If the Hellenic Government in 1923 could manage to agree terms with Kemal Ataturk, it is surely not beyond human ingenuity to devise a practical compact to recognize reality in relation to the Northern sector of Cyprus.
Unfortunately population transfer is sometimes the only means of resolving tensions in mixed communities. What happened in another part of Europe at the end of World War II was horrifying, the removal of all ethnic Germans from East of the Oder-Neisse Line, but it has worked effectively. No one wishes to see more such operat
-ions anywhere, if it can possibly be avoided, but it and other partitions between mutually hostile communities are sometimes inevitable, as in Northern Cyprus.
Is it feasible to distinguish between these arguments, just cited, and what is happening on the West Bank in Palestine, where the Israeli Government have been busily establishing Jewish settlements to create "ethnic facts"? The distinction would seem to be that the deliberate plantation of a hostile community in an ethnic-
ally uniform area is at the very least a provocative act, which might well in due course lead, not merely to conflict, but to ethnic cleansing. Indeed, some Israeli extremists have openly admitted that that is their ultimate aim, to rid historic Palestine of its Arabs. The Two State solution is, of course preferable, if only both parties could be induced to negotiate reasonably with each other. So far there is no consensus on what would be regarded as reasonable, although the widely held view outside Israel is that, sooner or later, Israelis will need to consider the logic of the withdrawal from Gaza, and apply that to the West Bank, thus making it feasible to comply with UN Resolution No.242.
All these issues are complex and emotionally difficult; years of diplomacy, political and social conditioning, and the exercise of much patience are likely to be needed, before any of them are resolved. Yet clear thinking is required now, stripping away illusions and misleading slogans.
Michael B. Buck.
neighbours, who in a more normal situation would be fellow citizens in the same state, but such a scenario, though logical, would be unattainable, with the result that de facto partition,or some form of population transfer - preferably not ethnic cleansing - is the future prospect. That leads to a further problem, the almost superstitious dread amongst the international community of changing international boundaries, for the mainly unspoken fear is that one change will lead to others, possibly less welcome.
The sentiment, "there but for the grace of God go I," is powerful, though not always rational. The effects are palpable; logic and practicality would seem to indicate that Bosnia & Herzegovina should have been partitioned years ago between the Croat and Bosniak area and the self-styled Republica Srpska, but continuing, and ultimately futile, efforts are being made to encourage the notion that there is a single Bosnian state. If that far-fetched belief has to be kept alive, then at best the two de facto statelets will have to be formally yoked together in a dyadic federation, in which there are the formal trappings, such as a president, drawn from one community and a vice-president from the other, and a joint legislative assembly, which rarely meets and hardly functions at all. If there are meetings, then they either take place on neutral ground, or else under the scrutiny of armed guards, preferably from NATO or a UN force.
The agenda of any such gathering (if it were ever held) would be confined to consensual and practical issues, if any. The long term hope would be that eventually some practical issues would emerge, requiring attention, and that even bitter antagonists would recognize the sense in cooperating for those limited, but
desirable,purposes, and act accordingly. Progress would be likely to be very
slow.
Cyprus is another instance, but there is an historical precedent, which could help, namely, the aftermath of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Then the contending parties, Greece and Turkey, agreed that mixed communities were impossible to maintain, and that the only peaceful and humane solution lay in population transfer. There followed exchanges between Asia Minor, which was emptied of Greeks, who settled instead in Greece, while minorities of Turks and other Muslims in Greek territory were transferred to Turkey. That arrangement, however distressing and traumatic, actually worked, achieving lasting peace.
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, however regrettable, has been followed by thirty-two years of occupation of the Northern zone, which has developed quite separately from the Southern sector, occupied by Greeks. The efforts to reunite the two sectors have had limited success, although both parts wish to be in full membership of the European Union, and the Turkish zone voted accordingly in 2004. To be strictly accurate, c.65% of the Turks did, while the vast majority of the Greeks
voted against - not because they opposed membership of the E.U., but to object to
reunification with the Northern sector on the basis of its continued existence as a distinctively Turkish community, organized as such. Thus far the European Union have treated Cyprus notionally as a whole as a member, but have in fact excluded the Turkish sector, although there was much satisfaction over the positive vote in the North in favour of EU membership. As a gesture of encouragement, the EU granted a substantial sum to the authorities in the North, to help develop that region economically.
However, the main impasse remains, for the Greeks in the South seem determined to reclaim the Northern sector, even to the point of asserting the claims of individual Greeks and their companies to the ownership of properties in the North, although many purchasers since 1974 have acquired those assets for their full market value and in accordance with the property laws existing in that sector. A month or so back an attempt by a former Greek owner to assert his claim to a dwelling bought by a British couple, who had arrived after the changes of 1974 and had acquired an apparently good title by Turkish Cypriot law, failed to do so. After a success in the courts of the South, he had tried to increase the pressure on the present occupiers by bringing an action in the English courts, but this was rejected.
Whether or not the English decision was right may be debateable, but what is disturbing is the absence of an agreed scheme for guaranteeing the rights of bona fide purchasers for value of properties in the North since 1974; and compensating fully those former owners or their heirs for the loss of the value of those properties effectively forfeited in 1974.
The irredentist attitudes of the Greek Cypriots, which have blocked the making of such an arrangement, simply obstruct the need for a settlement, so long overdue. If the Hellenic Government in 1923 could manage to agree terms with Kemal Ataturk, it is surely not beyond human ingenuity to devise a practical compact to recognize reality in relation to the Northern sector of Cyprus.
Unfortunately population transfer is sometimes the only means of resolving tensions in mixed communities. What happened in another part of Europe at the end of World War II was horrifying, the removal of all ethnic Germans from East of the Oder-Neisse Line, but it has worked effectively. No one wishes to see more such operat
-ions anywhere, if it can possibly be avoided, but it and other partitions between mutually hostile communities are sometimes inevitable, as in Northern Cyprus.
Is it feasible to distinguish between these arguments, just cited, and what is happening on the West Bank in Palestine, where the Israeli Government have been busily establishing Jewish settlements to create "ethnic facts"? The distinction would seem to be that the deliberate plantation of a hostile community in an ethnic-
ally uniform area is at the very least a provocative act, which might well in due course lead, not merely to conflict, but to ethnic cleansing. Indeed, some Israeli extremists have openly admitted that that is their ultimate aim, to rid historic Palestine of its Arabs. The Two State solution is, of course preferable, if only both parties could be induced to negotiate reasonably with each other. So far there is no consensus on what would be regarded as reasonable, although the widely held view outside Israel is that, sooner or later, Israelis will need to consider the logic of the withdrawal from Gaza, and apply that to the West Bank, thus making it feasible to comply with UN Resolution No.242.
All these issues are complex and emotionally difficult; years of diplomacy, political and social conditioning, and the exercise of much patience are likely to be needed, before any of them are resolved. Yet clear thinking is required now, stripping away illusions and misleading slogans.
Michael B. Buck.