Wednesday, March 05, 2008

HOW TO ENTRENCH THE REDLINES IN THE E.U. TREATY.

Back in September, 2007, I condemned Keith Vaz's suggestion, that there should be a referendum on the principle of membership of the E.U., rather than one on ratifying the latest Treaty. Now Nick Clegg, the new Liberal leader, has repeated Keith Vaz's error by instructing the Liberal Democrat M.P.s to abstain from voting on the Conservative motion, that there should be a vote in favour of a referendum on the Treaty. Apparently both men still believe that a repetition of the 1975 popular vote would resolve the present dispute; it wouldn't, and they know it. The truth is that it would merely endorse the decision, taken 33 years ago, which would suit them - and probably most British electors - and stifle unwanted debate on the real, if painful, issue.That is whether the so-called Red Line opt-outs, incorporated in the recent Treaty, are genuine safeguards of Britain's interests or not. Unfortunately much expert opinion is that these alleged safeguards are vulnerable and liable to be overruled, notably by decisions of the European Court. Gordon Brown, as Prime Minister, was morbidly anxious to avoid provoking another major clash with other E.U. leaders and shrank from insisting that the Red Line terms should, not merely be included in the Treaty, but be entrenched and made irrevocable. That was and is craven folly.
At the very least, David Cameron should warn Parliament,that if, as expected, today's Tory resolution is lost, at the first opportunity, after a Conservative victory at the next General Election, he would hold a consultative referendum. There would be two questions:-
[A] Do the voters wish to accept the present terms of the Treaty, that is without having adequate safeguards for Britain's vitally important Red Lined interests?
[B] If not, would they insist upon (1)the amendment of the Treaty to include such safeguards, or (2)would they prefer to reject the Treaty altogether?
The (by then) Conservative Government would recommend answer [B] (2) as the more prudent course.
The point of holding a consultative referendum is that it would not interfere with either U.K. or E.U.law, but it would send the clearest message to the leaders of the E.U. that either the Treaty is amended, as indicated, or else the U.K. would revoke the ratification made by the current Labour Government, thus rendering the Treaty invalid, as it would then not then be a unanimous decision by the members of the E.U. Logically this should compel a return to E.U.law as it was before the conclusion of the present Treaty, although in fact it would be more likely to provoke
a breach with the Union, especially if the U.K. passed legislation to the effect that the safeguards were to be inserted into the U.K. statute confirming the treaty, so far as Britain was concerned. The law in the E.U. would remain unchanged and the U.K.'s action would be regarded as illegal and an act of defiance, so actions would almost certainly be taken to remedy the breach and induce Britain to give way or
leave the E.U. In reality negotiations would be opened, in order to try and resolve the dispute, for the prospect of the U.K.'s departure would be too disturbing to contemplate. Quite what the outcome would be is hard to forecast, but probably some untidy compromise might well emerge, such as an agreement to defer the issue in dispute for, say, a decade, with a view to resuming negotiations then. Frankly, the longer the dispute continues, the better the chances are that the U.K.'s "defiance"
would succeed.
One conventional, but specious argument that has been repeatedly raised is that a "constitutional" change in the E.U. merits a referendum, but that a mere treaty does not. In fact the defence of basic safeguards for this country's interests could hardly be more important, and certainly requires a referendum; mere technical labels are irrelevant. The issues are too serious for a fatalistic hope, that the currently vulnerable Red Line guarantees would remain intact. This predicament leaves David Cameron and his colleagues with little option between making a stand on principle and abject surrender.
Michael B. Buck.

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