Friday, September 25, 2009

President Obama's Foreign Policy And The Implications.


The decision by President Obama to scrap the Missile Detection Project in the Czech Republic was refreshingly sane and prudent. Russian concerns in that regard have been sensibly addressed and tensions lowered. NATO's leaders have welcomed the change, which will enable minds to be focussed on real issues, such as the need to encourage members of the Alliance to reinforce the troops fighting the Taleban in Afghanistan, albeit on certain clearly defined terms. Much depends on the analysis of counter-insurgency and a thorough understanding of the motivations and relationships between the various factions within Afghan society.

That degree of comprehension applies equally to relations between the Western powers and Russia; it is important to avoid provocations such as offering NATO membership to Eastern European and South-West Asian countries other than the present 26 states. The idea of recruiting additional states such as the Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia is seen in Russia as aggressive, and it is certainly unnecessary. Of course many people in those states fear that their future is insecure, but the reality is that, for better or worse, they have a very powerful neighbour, whose policies tend to create a zone of influence. In fact a number of such states have successfully coped with such a predicament, notably Finland. It may be fashionable to decry the existence of zones of influence, but such zones are a reality, which need to be recognized. As it happens, in the Western hemisphere both Cuba and Venezuela are instances of the limits on the effectiveness of American hegemony.

Understandably critics point to Russian actions in Georgia and Chechnya, which they deplore, but in Russia Western actions in Kosovo and Serbia are seen as unwarranted interference in Balkan affairs. The lesson to be drawn from those instances is that the existence of spheres of influence is a reality, which needs to be handled with great care. It is, of course, always possible to exert diplomatic and economic pressures upon a power which is behaving oppressively within its own sphere of influence, but such actions always carry some degree of risk. It may be that intervention into another power's zone is justifiable on some moral ground, rather like the Western powers' actions in Kosovo, taken without the sanction of the United Nations, in order to avoid ethnic cleansing and bloodshed, but it will always be hazardous. Expediency in the form of non-intervention in conditions in which drastic remedial action seems morally right, may seem cowardly, but in reality there are severe limits to the feasibility of launching an attack in the nature of a "crusade." Quixotic, but frankly futile, initiatives are simply a prelude to disaster.

Unhappily there seems to be a growing view in NATO and the Western powers that
the intervention into Afghanistan is proving to be another misadventure, reminiscent of the Vietnamese War. General McChrystal, the American commander, has stressed the need for larger and more effective forces in order to crush the Taleban and their allies, and he has indicated that the coming year could well be decisive. Another
strategist, General Lamb, who has been engaged to advise, plan and implement effective counter-insurgency measures, has hinted that his remit is going to be extremely difficult, and that reasoning is not hard to understand. Those who favour disengagement and withdrawal, instead of continuing the armed struggle, believe that the balance of forces in Afghanistan supporting the Taleban are not monolithic and that potentially there are deep divisions which could be exploited. Such features, it is contended, could undermine the present insurgents and lead to a realignment of Afghans, of such a kind that a less hostile grouping could take over. The leaders of this potentially more moderate front could then reach terms with the NATO powers, so enabling a phased withdrawal to occur. It is an attractive idea, and amidst the
horrors of post-war Iraq, it has to be admitted that the jumbled coalition under Al-Maliki shows signs of stability and strength, enough for the Western powers to consider a carefully planned departure.

Whether or not a similarly successful alliance of moderate Afghans, including
dissident Taleban elements can be achieved is uncertain. General Lamb is optimistic,
but the western powers will need all their diplomatic skills and persuasive talents
to back him in the bid to form this much needed grouping, and give it real credibil-
ity. To be frank it seems to be the only real hope for the US, the rest of NATO and
moderate Afghans. The other point to bear in mind is that the potential allies and co-belligerents will be a highly assorted grouping, not containing many believers in Western democracy or, indeed, human rights.

The upshot is that counter-insurgency measures, though extremely important, are no substitute for a much deeper appraisal, analysis and formulation of policy
in respect of vulnerable countries such as Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi,
Congo (formerly Zaire) and the like. It is to be hoped that the US State Department, the United Kingdom's Foreign Office and the foreign policy advisers of other Western powers will take seriously the factors and reasoning stated above. Failure to do so will lead to catastrophe.

Michael B. Buck.

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